Object Recognition Can Be Viewpoint Dependent or Invariant – It's Just a Matter of Time and Task by Milivojevic, Branka
COMPUTATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE
Object recognition can be viewpoint dependent or  
invariant – it’s just a matter of time and task
Branka Milivojevic1,2*
1  Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands
2  Experimental and Developmental Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
*Correspondence: branka.mili@gmail.com
As we move through our environment, we 
encounter familiar objects from various 
viewpoints. Despite the ensuing variabil-
ity of the images projected onto the retina, 
we have seemingly little difficulty when it 
comes to recognizing objects we encoun-
ter. We can, however, see how the objects 
are oriented, suggesting that object rec-
ognition is to a certain degree dissociable 
from perception of other object “features” 
such as orientation. Changes in orienta-
tion of objects, particularly inversion, can 
also affect how we perceive the objects. A 
particularly illustrative example (shown in 
Figure 1) is that of the Thatcher illusion 
(Thompson, 1980), where the grotesque 
appearance of a face with its inverted eyes 
and mouth is “hidden” when the whole 
face is also inverted. The percept itself, 
therefore, is affected by the change in ori-
entation. In addition, there are also sub-
tle effects of viewpoint changes on object 
recognition itself. For example, identifying 
rotated objects is more difficult when they 
are briefly presented than when viewing 
time is unlimited (Lawson and Jolicoeur, 
2003), and identifying a face is considerably 
more difficult the face has been inverted 
(Yin, 1969), as is discrimination between 
characters “b” and “d,” or “p” and “q” which 
requires (physical or mental) rotation of 
the characters to upright, before we can 
be certain which letter we are looking at 
(Corballis and McLaren, 1984).
These subtle, yet persistent, effects of view-
point changes on perception and recognition 
arise as a consequence of how visual object 
processing is handled by the brain. Here, I 
discuss how neural mechanisms underlying 
visual processing give rise to perception and 
recognition which can be both viewpoint 
dependent and viewpoint invariant depend-
ing on the timing of those processes, as well as 
specific task demands or current “perceptual 
goals” of an individual. To do so, I will firstly 
explain how temporal dynamics of low-level 
visual processing may give rise to impaired 
recognition at short viewing latencies and 
suggest that this may also relate to effects of 
viewpoint changes on perceptual experience. 
I will then discuss how the perceptual goals of 
an individual determines whether recogni-
tion is accomplished in viewpoint invariant 
or dependent manner with a particular focus 
on cognitive operations thought to be sub-
served by ventral and dorsal visual streams, 
namely object recognition and mental rota-
tion, respectively.
PercePtion is affected by  
Point of view
Change in orientation must affect process-
ing of visual information. For example, as 
our viewpoint changes, so does the shape of 
the image that falls on the retina. In the case 
of picture-plane rotations, the orientation 
of the edges of that shape will also change 
and thus stimulate different populations of 
orientation-tuned visually responsive neu-
rons in primary visual cortex. However, 
these initial effects of orientation-changes 
on neural processing probably do not give 
rise to altered perceptual experience such 
as those associated with inversion of a 
Thatcherized face.
Inversion affects how we perceive the spa-
tial relations between objects’ features and 
may, as James (1890) suggested, depend on 
perceptual experience with an object at a 
given orientation. This could explain why 
recognition of faces is particularly impaired 
by inversion: faces are most frequently seen 
the right way up, and are thought to be 
recognized using information about the 
configuration of the constituent features. 
As mirror reversal is also a special case of a 
configural change where the relative config-
uration of object’s features remains the same 
but reverses in its left–right orientation, this 
could also explain why mirror–images are 
difficult to tell apart when they are rotated 
away from a canonical viewpoint, and which 
is why we must rotate objects into alignment 
with our egocentric reference frames before 
we can distinguish between parity-defined 
characters such as “b” and “d” (Corballis 
and McLaren, 1984). Interestingly, neural 
responses to unaltered and thatcherized 
images also follow the perceptual illusion 
and disappear as the face is rotated away 
from upright (Milivojevic et al., 2003a).
On neural level, large changes in the 
viewpoint of an object, such as inversion 
of faces (Rossion et al., 2000) and alphanu-
meric characters (Milivojevic et al., 2008), 
result in delays of the N170 component. The 
N170 is thought to reflect object classifica-
tion, and inversion-related delays of N170 
possibly reflect increases in time required 
to accumulate sufficient neural activity 
to reach a threshold at which recognition 
can occur (Perrett et al., 1998; Heekeren 
et al., 2008). If changes in viewpoint delay 
visual object encoding, this could explain 
why accurate recognition of rotated objects 
requires longer viewing times than rec-
ognition of canonically oriented objects 
(Jolicoeur and Landau, 1984; Lawson and 
Jolicoeur, 2003; Mack and Palmeri, 2011).
viewPoint matters only for some 
PercePtual goals
Task-dependent effect of viewpoint changes 
on neural processing are only observed 
around 250 ms after stimulus onset and 
coincide with the P2 component of the ERP. 
For example, if the observers need to deter-
mine whether a rotated alphanumeric char-
acter is normal or mirror-reversed, they will 
mentally rotate it to upright before mak-
ing the decision. Although the beginning of 
mental rotation is later than the P2, parity 
decisions are associated with linear increases 
of P2 amplitudes while this is not the case 
for P2 preceding categorization of alpha-
numeric characters which does not require 
mental rotation (Milivojevic et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, similar increases in P2 ampli-
tudes can be observed as a consequence of 
stimulus degradation, either by addition of 
noise (Banko et al., 2011) or by occlusion 
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in object recognition within the inferior 
temporal cortex for various object classes 
such as faces (Haxby et al., 1999), bodies 
(Brandman and Yovel, 2010), landscapes 
(Epstein et al., 2006). Some authors have 
suggested that this increase in activity may 
reflect a shift in recognition strategy from 
one that is based on the whole shape to one 
that is based on the analysis of individual 
object features (i.e., details Jolicoeur, 1990).
recognizing Parity-defined 
shaPes requires mental rotation
Decisions regarding the direction of the 
left–right axis of an object, or its handed-
ness, require alignment between the object 
and our own egocentric frame of reference. 
For example, deciding whether a shoe is the 
left or the right one requires either physical 
or mental rotation of the shoe into align-
ment with our feet, or the feet with the shoe. 
The same holds for any object class that has 
a well-defined left–right orientation, such 
as alphanumeric characters, which can be 
readily recognized as “backward” if they 
have been mirror-reversed (Cooper and 
Shepard, 1973) – but only if they are pre-
sented at upright. Rotated characters require 
rotation to their canonical upright before we 
can notice if they are normal or backward, 
particularly if they are rotated by a large 
degree (Kung and Hamm, 2010). When the 
identity of an object depends on its left–right 
parity, as is the case with lower-case letters 
“b” and “d” or “p” and “q,” then the discrimi-
nation of such characters also requires rota-
tion to upright before it can be successfully 
recognized (Corballis and McLaren, 1984).
This suggests that information regarding 
the identity of the object must be extracted 
before information about the handedness 
of an object can be determined. Although 
generally we need to recognize an object 
before mental rotation begins (Heil et al., 
1996; Schendan and Lucia, 2009), this can-
not be the case for objects whose identity 
depends on their handedness, such as “b” 
and “d” or “p” and “q.” With the excep-
tion of alphanumeric characters, there are 
not many commonly encountered objects 
whose identity is defined by parity (i.e., a 
hand is a hand irrespective of whether it is a 
left one or a right one) and those objects can 
be seen as special case whose identity cannot 
be determined at all orientations. For these 
objects, identification from a feature-based 
nized as faces, what seems to be disrupted 
is the identification of the face as belonging 
to a particular person or   identification of an 
emotional expression, while differentiation 
between categories of “face” and “non-face” 
objects is largely unimpaired by inversion.
The difference in viewpoint-sensitivity 
of identification and categorization has also 
been established for other classes of objects. 
For example, identifying letters of the alpha-
bet is affected by character orientation while 
the same is not the case for between-category 
decisions such as letter–digit categorization 
(Corballis et al., 1978). In a sense, categori-
zation may relate to recognition at a basic or 
entry level described by Roch (Rosch et al., 
1976), while identification may be more 
closely related subordinate-level recogni-
tion. Object recognition at basic level (e.g., 
deciding a shape is a dog) are not affected 
by changes in viewpoint, while subordinate-
level decisions (e.g., identifying a dog as a 
poodle) are affected by viewpoint changes 
in terms of reaction times and accuracy 
(Hamm and McMullen, 1998).
Studies which have directly com-
pared identification and categorization 
of objects using neuroimaging methods 
are scarce. Nevertheless, studies investi-
gating neural correlates of rotated-object 
categorization show little evidence of 
 orientation-dependence at visual process-
ing stages beyond the initial encoding of 
the objects (see above). In contrast, stud-
ies investigating rotated-object recognition 
either as identity-matching or in terms of 
explicit identification show that there is 
(Doniger et al., 2000), but not size transfor-
mation (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2003), 
suggesting that changes in   orientation 
degrade certain types of perceptual infor-
mation which may be required for task-
specific decision making, and may be, thus, 
associated with some form of perceptual 
decision making (Heekeren et al., 2008; 
Schendan and Lucia, 2009, 2010), such as 
whether sufficient information is available 
for the perceptual goal to be achieved. This 
decision would then trigger other visuos-
patial cognitive operations, such as men-
tal rotation or more detailed inspection 
of individual features of an object. Those 
cognitive operations would lead to acqui-
sition of additional information about the 
object which would, in turn, enable a more 
accurate completion of the perceptual task 
at hand. For the purpose of illustration, two 
types of “perceptual goals” that depend on 
object orientation will be described: object 
identification and parity-based recognition.
identification is viewPoint 
dePendent but categorisation  
is not
As already mentioned, face recognition is 
worse when faces are inverted (Yin, 1969), 
both in terms of reduced recognition accu-
racy and increased reaction times. This seems 
to be the case both for familiar and unfamil-
iar faces, and may be a consequence of dis-
rupted neural processing underlying object 
classification although a causal relationship 
has not been firmly established. It should be 
noted here that faces are nevertheless recog-
Figure 1 | unaltered and “thatcherized” version of Margaret Thatcher’s face. The grotesque 
appearance of the face when its eyes and mouth are inverted is hidden by the inversion of the whole 
image. Rotating the pictures to upright makes discrimination between the two versions of the face easier.
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descriptor such as “a semi-circle attached at 
an end of a long stem” could lead to selec-
tion of possible four candidates, and the 
remaining possibilities would need to be 
resolved with mental rotation.
Mental rotation has been associated with 
linear increases in centro-parietal negativ-
ity between ∼400 and 800 ms after stimulus 
onset (e.g., Milivojevic et al., 2009b) which 
last somewhat longer for larger angu-
lar departures from upright (Milivojevic 
et al., 2003b; Hamm et al., 2004). The ERP 
correlates of mental rotation are prob-
ably generated by a distributed network of 
sources localized (Milivojevic et al., 2009b) 
within a network of prefrontal and poste-
rior parietal areas which has been identified 
using fMRI (e.g., Milivojevic et al., 2009a). 
Whether these areas also subserve recogni-
tion of rotated parity-defined objects is still 
unclear as this particular question has not 
been investigated using neuroimaging.
summary and conclusion
Although changes in viewpoint rarely inter-
fere with common perceptual goals, such 
as categorizing objects into basic catego-
ries, this type of viewpoint invariant rec-
ognition can only be achieved after initial 
viewpoint-dependent neural processing has 
been accomplished. Depending on current 
perceptual goals, changes in viewpoint may 
impose certain recognition costs, observ-
able in terms of increased response latencies 
or reduced accuracy. These costs are likely to 
reflect increased cognitive demands associ-
ated with recognition of misoriented shapes 
such as detailed analysis of object features or 
mental rotation of the shape to its canoni-
cal upright. In this sense, recognition of 
objects will always be affected by changes 
in viewpoint early on in the visual process-
ing stream, but these effects will taper off 
with time. At later visual processing stages, 
some types of perceptual goals such as 
object identification or parity discrimi-
nation, will require additional processing 
operations which will give rise to viewpoint 
dependent behavioral performance.
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